Thucydides and international relations

Thucydides and inter bailiwick relationsThucydides is seen by some scholars as the first author in the realist tradition as well as the founding father of global dealing.1 There ar melodic phraseing interpretations of the History of the Peloponnesian War as Thucydides rarely gives his opinion ab proscribed the so farts described and the characters actions. This adjudicate will adopt the realist interpretation of Thucydides and argue that he is still germane(predicate) now due to the prevalence of fear, self arouse and advocator government activity in todays world. It will exercising competing interpretations of his work to show that, even though there are important differences between his world and todays world, his insights into human nature are relevant and are one of the best sources to learn from history.2Thucydides work is valuable as it investigates the causes and dynamics of contend. He states What do war inevitable was the growth of Athenian position and the fear which this caused in Sparta. 3 According to Lebow, part innovation theories are based on the premise that hegemons are unwilling to relinquish their status to upcoming authoritys.4 part convert theories investigate how a shift in an actors berth in the system affects other actors. Theorists adjudicate the critical importance of changes in the coition power of states as these changes produce fear and result in the credential dilemma. Thus the system becomes increasingly unstable and small events can precipitate a major(ip) conflict. 5 Sparta was afraid that a shift in the balance of power would be to the detriment of its national security and thus according to power vicissitude theory it felt aggression was necessary to address the imbalance. A theme that dominates Thucydides narrative is how fear in conjunction with honour and interest result in a state taking action in the hope of safeguarding its national security and independence.6 The Peloponnesian war was the gr owth of two developments. The first was the uneven and unprecedented growth of capital of Greece. The issuance of the Megarian Decree was a nonher provocative action. Athens believed that the integrity of their pudding stone was at stake due to their fear of a revolt of their colonies. Athenss use of sparing sanctions aimed to dislodge Megara from its alliance with Sparta posing a prepare threat to Spartan and Corinthian security.7 The Corinthians warned their Spartan consort that unless they asserted themselves against the Athenians, they (the Corinthians) would form a new alliance thus harming Spartan security. Thus Sparta delivered the ultimatum calling for the revocation of the Megarian decree. Rejection of the ultimatum was the immediate cause of the war. Thus the security dilemma can be said to name cloud the hegemons into a war that n either desired.8 A modern example of this theory is the change in American perception of Soviet power after the first Soviet ICBM launch . The so called missile ranch resulted in US insecurity as the Kennedy administration believed Khruschchev was behaving aggressively in Berlin because he felt the power balance was shifting in his favour. Concern to maintain US power led Kennedy to increase the US strategic buildup.9 However Kauppi states that there are intervening variables forestalling the shifting balance of power leading to war in the cold war world. He cites modern examples of the restraining effect of nuclear weapons, and the existence of neutrals as having a stabilizing influence by non entrapping the superpowers in a zero sum game. He alike cites the role of ideology as convincing some(prenominal) superpowers that they could win without war. 10 Thus while power transition theory and the resultant fear explain the pressure imposed on states, other factors can prevent fear from resulting in war. Lebow contests the basis of power transition theory by pointing out that Athens reached the zenith of its power 20 years before the outbreak of war, he adds that it is the perception of power that is vital to power transition theory and war. The effect of middle powers like Corinth is another factor to debate. 11 While there was no direct conflict between the superpowers in the cold war, the massive defence budgets and development of weapons of mass destruction shows that both superpowers were using fear to deter their enemy and acting on fear by arming themselves.another(prenominal) central feature of Thucydides thought is that of self interest. According to Gilpin, Thucydides believed that human nature was unchanging and since human beings were drive by interest, pride and fear, they always seek to increase their wealth until others driven by like passions, sieve to stop them.12 In the Melian dialogue the Athenians say Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to close that it is a general and necessary integrity of nature to rule wherever one can. 13 The Athenians stat e that maintaining their empire is their only concern and they try to convince the Melians that it is in their interest to surrender. They ask the Melians to ignore the matter of referee and claim that it is not in Spartas interest to intervene on their behalf.14 The Melian dialogue shows the primacy of self interest not only as a practical course of action but as a law of nature. A modern example of self interest is the statist concept the national interest- seen in the Mytilenian debate. Even though Cleon and Diodotus have different thoughts of the way forward they both seek to deal with the situation to Athenss benefit. For Diodotus, considerations of justice are inapplicable to interstate relations. 15 A modern example of the national interest at work is the October, 2006 coupled States doctrine on space. The United States will preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US nati onal interests. 16 In todays world while the national interest is seen as a guiding principle it need not always be action by a sole state. States may cooperate to ensure the common good. In an increasingly globalised world states must consider and temper their exercise of national interest. The development of international law, particularly humanitarian law, shows that there are norms of non encumbrance and human rights that states are obliged to follow. Condemnation from the international community in case of their violation would not be in a states national interest. Thus while the national interest is a rudimentary component of state decision making, today, the experience of two world wars and the prevalence of liberal ideas mean that the national interest is still important but not the sole reason for state behaviour.Self interest and fear result in power politics. The Athenians say ones ability to engage in power politics depends on strength. The standard of justice, depends on the equality of power to compel and that, in fact, the strong do what they have the power to do and the worn accept what they have to accept.17 Thus ones ability to enforce ones demands depends on relative power. The quote above from the Melian dialogue shows Athens warning Melos to submit as they are too weak to resist. Since there is anarchy in relations among states, the order that exists is created and sustained by the powerful that impose their power within their sphere of influence. States, like individuals, are motivated by fear and self interest and assemblage to justice only when their interest is served. The natural right of the stronger to rule over the weaker is a rather simplistic explanation and justification of imperialism. 18 A modern example of this is the ultimatum given by the US warning countries that they were either with us or against us. This can be seen as a threat to compel unity in the war on terror. Thucydides adds that an actors power determines his treatment thus showing the essential nature of the balance of power in international relations. This is the safe rule to stand up to ones equals, to do with deference towards ones superiors and to treat ones inferiors with moderation. 19 A quote from US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice just about nations that didnt support the war on Iraq illustrates this retaliate France, ignore Germany and forgive Russia.20 For Thucydides it is a law of nature that the weak become subject to the strong and when the fortune of aggrandisement is offered by superior strength considerations of right and wrong are sacrificed to self interest. 21 Welch adds that while Thucydides does not deny the notion of universal justice he simply acknowledges that for better or worse it has no constraining force in a system composed of states unequal in power.22 However Bagby argues that not all states choose to maximise power. He cites the example of Sparta and how the Corinthians call them timid and weak in contrast to Athens. King Archidamus of Sparta confirms these national differences when he asks fellow Spartans to be not ashamed of the slowness and dilatoriness for which they lecture us most.23 According to Doyle, the political ideologies of both Athens and Sparta, and the different sectors of society they appealed to, were an important component of their conflict. He picks up on Thucydides emphasis on the national character of Athens, both in its restless last and its democratic institutions, as well as the character of Sparta, with its slow and cautious character and the conservation of its oligarchic institutions.24 Thus the goal to maximize power can be seen as a powerful inducement but domestic influences and domestic character are also important.In conclusion, Thucydides was among the first to set out three basic assumption of classical political realism states are the key units of action, they seek power either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends and they behave in ways that are by and large rational. 25 While Thucydides has been interpreted in various ways, his ideas about human nature fear, self interest and power maximisation are enduring. They explain the pressures acting on states in todays world pushing them to make decisions. While there are many differences between today and his time, Thucydides effectively explains the psychological and social tendencies in strategy and is thus still relevant today.Bibliography supranational relations in Political Thought texts from the ancient Greeks to the first of all World War, Brown, C, Nardin, T and Rengger N, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.The commit and Abuse of Thucydides, Bagby, L, International Organization, 48, 1, Winter.Political Theories of International Relations, Boucher, D, Oxford, Oxford University Press.Ways of War and Peace, Doyle, M, New York, Norton, 1997.Hegemonic Rivalry, R N Lebow, B Strauss (eds), Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1991.why International R elations theorists should stop reading Thucydides, Welch, D, Review of International Studies, 29, 3, 2003.www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0525-09.htmhttp//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6063926.stmPaul Viotti and crack Kauppi as cited in Bagby, L, The engross and Abuse of Thucydides, International Organization, 48, 1, Winter, Page 131Lebow, R, Hegemonic Rivalry, R N Lebow, B Strauss (eds), Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1991, Page 1Brown, C, Nardin, T and Rengger N, International Relations in Political Thought texts from the ancient Greeks to the First World War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, Page 36Lebow, R, Hegemonic Rivalry, R N Lebow, B Strauss (eds), Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1991, Page 135Welch, D, wherefore International Relations theorists should stop reading Thucydides, Review of International Studies, 29, 3, 2003, page 301Kauppi, M, Hegemonic Rivalry, R N Lebow, B Strauss (eds), Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1991, Page 103-104Gilpin, R, Hegemonic Rivalry, R N Lebow, B Strauss (eds), Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1991, Page 34-35Lebow, R, Hegemonic Rivalry, R N Lebow, B Strauss (eds), Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1991, Page 127Lebow, R, Hegemonic Rivalry, R N Lebow, B Strauss (eds), Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1991, Page 142Gilpin, R, Hegemonic Rivalry, R N Lebow, B Strauss (eds), Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1991, Page 47-48Lebow, R, Hegemonic Rivalry, R N Lebow, B Strauss (eds), Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1991, Page 128As cited by Welch, Welch, D, why International Relations theorists should stop reading Thucydides, Review of International Studies, 29, 3, 2003, Page 304Brown, C, Nardin, T and Rengger N, International Relations in Political Thought texts from the ancient Greeks to the First World War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, Page 57IbidWelch, D, Why International Relations theorists should stop reading Thucydides, Review of International Studies, 29, 3, 2003, Page 76http//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6063926.stmBrown, C, Nardin, T and Rengger N, International Relations in Political Thought texts from the ancient Greeks to the First World War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, Page 52Welch, D, Why International Relations theorists should stop reading Thucydides, Review of International Studies, 29, 3, 2003, Page 75Brown, C, Nardin, T and Rengger N, International Relations in Political Thought texts from the ancient Greeks to the First World War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, Page 58www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0525-09.htmWelch, D, Why International Relations theorists should stop reading Thucydides, Review of International Studies, 29, 3, 2003, Page 75IbidBagby, L, The Use and Abuse of Thucydides, International Organization, 48, 1, Winter, Page 138Doyle, M, Ways of War and Peace, New York, Norton, 1997, Page 150-152Keohane as cited in Bagby, L, The Use and Abuse of Thucydides, International Organization, 48, 1, Winter, Page 132